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VOLUME XLI JUNE, 1935 NumEER 4
FUNCTIONS OF A DEMURRER UNDER
THE REVISED CODE
LEo CARmUN*
The Revised Code undertakes to establish the demurrer as the
uniform method of objecting to the insufficiency of pleadings.
Although the intention was to accomplish a maximum of uniformi-
ty and simplicity, not only as to selection of the remedy, but also,
presumably, as to its operative effect, there already may be detected
some divergence of opinion among members of the bar as to the
specific application of the new provisions. As an illustration of
conclusions that may be too hastily drawn, perhaps due to a super-
ficial consideration of the apparent general motives by which the
Revisers were actuated, may be mentioned the impression which
seems to prevail among some to the effect that no objection of any
sort can be interposed to a pleading except through the medium of
a demurrer. A brief analysis of the statutes and a comparison of
the present provisions with the common law and equity practice
and prior statutory regulations which have been superseded may
help to clarify the situation. It is perhaps superfluous to state
that space will not permit any attempt to cover more than a few of
the more prominent features of the subject.
Demurrers are divided into two classes, general and special.
A special demurrer assigns grounds of demurrer. A gen-
eral demurrer assigns no grounds and the grounds are not
known until disclosed in the argument. Under the original com-
mon law, with a single exception,1 the distinction between the two
classes was wholly one of form and did not involve any differenti-
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'Duplicity. Anonymous, 3 Salk. 122 (1704).
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ation as to the subject-matter upon which the demurrer operated.
All defects, subtantial and formal, with the sole exception of
duplicity, were equally open to either kind of demurrer. It is said
that, in the days of oral pleading at the bar of the court, no incon-
venience arose from omission to assign grounds in a demurrer,
because exceptions were taken to the pleadings as delivered; but
that, when the pleadings were required to be written, a demurrer
might be filed in advance of the argument, and it became expedient,
in order to prepare for the argument, to have the grounds disclosed
in the demurrer.2 As a result, in the reign of Elizabeth, a statute8
was enacted which, by the use of general terms, was intended to
prohibit a general demurrer as to formal defects -the less meri-
torious grounds of objection. But the lawyers and the courts, dis-
playing an attitude toward innovation and an aptitude for circum-
vention such as so frequently have defeated efforts at reform,
immediately proceeded to nullify the intended effect of the statute.
As a consequence, in the course of a few decades, a number of de-
fects purely formal in nature had been adjudicated substantial
defects. To meet this turn of events, in the reign of Anne, as a
supplement to the former. statute, a second statute4 was enacted,
which specifically enumerated a series of defects and declared
them to be formal, and hence subject only to a special demurrer.
The result of the two statutes, of course, was not to preclude ob-
jections to formal defects, but merely to prescribe a special de-
murrer as the only mechanism by which objections could be inter-
posed.
Statutes more or less similar in effect to the English statutes
have been adopted in many of the American states, some of them
later to be superseded by practice code provisions. In West Vir-
ginia, however, the zeal for reform was not to be satisfied with a
mere regulation of the methods of objecting. Instead of under-
taking to differentiate between the respective functions of general
and special demurrers, the statutes5 have undertaken, with the
exception of defects in pleas in abatement' and certain formal de-
fects subjected to a special statutory method of objecting herein-
2 flea.
3 27 ELIZ., c. 5, § 1.
44 Amrr, c. 16, § 1.
5 Carlin, The Common Law Declaration in West Virginia (1928) 35 W. VA.
L. Q. 1; Carlin, Common Law 2'leas and Subsequent Pleadings in West Vir-
ginia (1931) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 14.
6 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 37. This Code will be cited
hereinafter as Rav. CODE.
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after mentioned, to abolish all objections to formal defects.
Furthermore, possibly on the assumption that special demurrers
were no longer necessary, the former Code prescribed a form of de-
murrer7 which has been construed as general in effect., As a re-
sult,' it has commonly been said that special demurrers have been
abolished in West Virginia, although there has never been any
provision in the Code expressly so stating. The meaning of the
statement, of course, so far as it is based on the abolishment of ob-
jections to formal defects, is that special demurrers have been
abolished because all of the objections which formerly required
their use have been abolished, ignoring the fact that under the
original common law and the later English statutes a party had the
right, at his election, to demur specially - assign grounds of de-
murrer- as to substantial defects, if he cared to do so.10
Although the conclusion that special demurrers have been
abolished in West Virginia may be understood as expressing only
a half truth, its acceptance as a whole truth has led to an entirely
new concept as to the basis of differentiation between general and
special demurrers. As already indicated, the original basis of
distinction was purely one of form, involving no inquiry as to the
nature of the defects upon which the demurrer operated. But in
West Virginia, prior to the Revised Code, the nature of a demurrer
has been defined with reference to the subject matter - the defects
- upon which it operates, and not with reference to its form. There
was nothing that prevented a demurrant from stating grounds in
his demurrer, and the fact that they were so stated of course did
not preclude the court from considering them. Nevertheless, in
spite of its form, such a demurrer was only a general demurrer
unnecessarily assigning grounds."
7 W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 125, § 28. This Code will be cited
hereinafter as CODE 1923.
s See Cook v. Dorsey, 38 W. Va. 196, 18 S. E. 468 (1893).
9 In some instances, the prescribed form of demurrer is referred to as
accomplishing the result. See Cook v. Dorsey, supra n. 8. In other instances,
the abolishment of objections to formal defects is suggested as the instru-
mentality. See Coyle v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 11 W. Va. 94 (1877).
10 The statement, frequently made, that special demurrers have been abol-
ished except as to pleas in abatement involves an inaccuracy resulting from
the haziness of definition noted. What is really meant is that pleas in abate-
ment are still subject to demurrer because of formal defects. A general
demurrer reaches formal defects in pleas in abatement. Mantz v. Hendley,
2 Henning & Munford 308 (Va. 1808).
11 Miller v. McLuer, Gilmer, 338 (Va. 1820); Oliver Refining Co. v. Ports-
mouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp., 109 Va. 513, 64 S. E. 56 (1909); BuRxs,
PLEAING AND PRACTICE (1913) 341. Such would necessarily be the result if
special demurrers have been abolished.
The term "general demurrer" is frequently used to describe a demurrer
3
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Under the Revised Code,'2 all demurrers in civil cases must be
in writing and must assign grounds.
"All demurrers in civil cases shall be in writing and shall
state specifically the grounds of demurrer relied on, and no
grounds shall be considered other than those stated, except by
the court of its own accord, but the demurrant may, by leave
of the court, amend his demurrer by stating additional
grounds, or otherwise, at any time before the trial at law or
final hearing in equity."
This section prescribes, 'in form, a special demurrer in all
cases; but there is nothing in the Revised Code changing the policy
of former statutes abolishing objections to formal defects, and
hence no reason is perceived why the courts should not continue
the former concept and, if it is important to make any distinction
at all, treat a demurrer under the present statutes, regardless of its
form, merely as a general demurrer assigning grounds. The only
difference between the present situation and the former is that
formerly the assignment of grounds was optional, while now it is
compulsory.
It is, of course, impracticable to define the situations in which
the court should permit the assignment of additional grounds by
way of amendment. It is such impracticability that impelled the
Revisers to leave the whole matter to the discretion of the court.
Presumably, in determining the propriety of an amendment, the
court will look to such matters as the time of the application to
amend, the nature of the proposed additional ground, and diligence
of the demurrant.
which goes to a whole pleading, as distinguished from one directed to only a
part of a pleading. Such a usage may lead to confusion. See Henderson v.
Stringer, 6 Gratt. 130 (Va. 1849), apparently misinterpreted by BURKS, supra.
Also, see Pyles v. Carney, 85 W. Va. 159, 101 S. E. 174 (1919). Similarly,
the term "special demurrer" is frequently used to describe a general demurrer
going to a part of a pleading.
The following provision in the former Code (the last sentence of c. 125,
§ 29) has been omitted from the Revised Code as superseded by e. 56, art. 4,
§ 36, of the revision (see revisers' note to c. 56, art. 4, § 37).
If nothing be alleged by the demurrant in support of his demurrer, the
court, il it overrule the same, shall state that fact in the order; and if final
judgment be obtained in the cause by the party whose pleading is demurred
to, the same shall not be reversed by reason of any defect in the pleading so
demurred to."
This provision was construed as applying only to common law pleadings.
Anderson v. Anderson, 78 W. Va. 118, 88 S. E. 653 (1916). Since it uses
the word "alleged", it might have been construed as requiring grounds to be
alleged in thee demurrer, but was not so construed. Seemingly, the interpre-
tation was correct. Otherwise, there would have been no need for a court order
to show whdt had occurred. See Cook v. Dorsey, supra n. 8.
12 C. 56, art. 4, § 36.
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There is no provision as to how the court shall deal with
grounds not assigned but which the court may consider of its own
accord. However, a consideration of the purpose for which
grounds are required to be stated ought to give a clue as to how the
court should deal with those omitted. The primary object in re-
quiring assignment of grounds must have been to give the de-
murrant and the demurree an equal advantage in preparation for
argument of the demurrer. Apparently, the mere fact that the
demurrant has in some way called attention to an unassigned
ground orally, at the argument or elsewhere, should not preclude
the court from considering the ground of its own accord. Other-
wise, the court might be compelled to try the case on an immaterial
issue. But to permit the demurrant, without amending his de-
murrer and subjecting himself to the possibility of a continuance
because of the amendment, to argue the ground, would plainly
obviate the general purpose of the statute. If the unassigned
ground has come to the attention of the court in such a manner as
to indicate that the demurrant was unaware of it at the time of the
argument, there would seem to be no impropriety in the court's
calling upon both parties for argument, although it seems clear
that it would not be error to refuse argument in such a case. It
would seem that the appellate practice, where grounds of error not
assigned in the petition are noticed by the appellate court, should
offer a helpful analogy.
In one respect, the new statute offers an opportunity for com-
plications in the procedure. The courts will now be presented with
problems relating to the form of the demurrer. Unless a liberal
attitude shall be adopted, construction of the statute may become
very technical with reference to sufficiency of statement of the
grounds - especially, with reference to the necessary degree of
particularity. The change from the old to the new practice is in
the nature of a change from general to special pleading and in-
volves the usual consequences of multiplying questions with re-
ference to the mere functional sufficiency of the pleading process.13
As a method of testing the sufficiency of a common law
pleading or a bill in equity, a demurrer performs practically the
same functions at law and in equity. It is the one method of
testing the sufficiency of the pleading as such and it challenges the
s uficiency alone. Sufficiency, of course, includes both substance
1.1 The Virginia courts have had to deal with this proposition. See Morriss
v. White, 146 Va. 553, 131 S. E. 835 (1926); Richmond College v. Scott-
Nuchols Co., 124 Va. 333, 98 S. E. 1 (1919).
5
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and form, to the extent that objections to form have not been
abolished. But whatever the lack of sufficiency, it can be sought
by a demurrer only within the allegations or formal requisites of
the pleading itself and the prior record of the case to which the
pleading is related, and not within circumstances extraneous to the
pleading and the record.14  Furthermore, the defect must be one
which goes to the operative effect of the pleading as a pleading,
and not to something which constitutes a mere extraneous condition
precedent to availability of the pleading. Hence it has been held
that a pleading is not demurrable because it has been tendered or
filed too late ;" because it lacks a verification by affidavit required
by statute;". or, in most jurisdictions,1 7 because it has not been
signed, although the contrary has been held in West Virginia as to
a bill in chancery.8 It has been held that the objection that an
amended declaration departs from the original by way of setting
up a new and different cause of action can not be reached by a
demurrer. 9 In fact, it may be stated generally that, where for any
cause the propriety of filing or asserting a pleading, rather than
its sufficiency, is involved, a demurrer is not the proper remedy.2"
In all such eases, the proper method of raising the objection is by
motion to reject or motion to strike.
In equity, independently of statute, it is elementary law that
a demurrer can be interposed only to a bill, and hence is not avail-
able to test the sufficiency of a plea or an answer. The sufficiency
of a plea is tested by setting it down for argument, the result be-
ing practically the same as if a demurrer were interposed. The
method of testing the sufficiency of an answer depends upon the
nature of the defect. Strictly, exceptions to an answer are filed
because it fails to respond to the bill in some respect, and particu-
larly because it fails to give sufficient discovery.2' The result of
14 Morgan v. Dyer, 10 Johns. 161 (N. Y. 1813) ; 49 C. J. 420 et seq., 21 R.
C. L. 504 et seq.
15 Morgan v. Dyer, supra n. 14; Cobb v. Miller, Ripley & Co., 9 Ala. 499(1846); Smith v. Champion, 102 Ga. 92, 29 S. E. 160 (1897); 49 C. J. 384,
n. 76.
16 Lewis v. Hicks, 96 Va. 91, 30 S. E. 466 (1898), holding that the affidavit
is not a part of the pleading and may be waived; 49 C. J. 383-4, citing some
cases contra; 49 C. J. 709.
17 49 C. J. 383, 708; 10 R. C. L. 427-8.
18 Dever v. Willis, 42 W. Va. 365, 26 S. E. 176 (1896).
19 McMechen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 90 W. Va. 21, 110 S. E. 474
(1922), and cases cited.
20 Cross v. Kemp, 45 X. J. L. 51 (1883).
21F iETHa, EQUrY PLAING AND Pa ACTIC (1913) §§ 332-334; CLEPHANE,
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTiE (1926) 285, 297; 1 WHI=EHOUSE, EQMUr
PACCE (1915) §§ 272, 273; LAwODELL, EQuITy PLEADING (1883) § 82.
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sustaining the exceptions, of course, is to compel the defendant to
answer further. If the answer is defective as a pleading in such a
way as to make it demurrable if it were a common law pleading,
the orthodox method of taking advantage of the deficiency is to set
the cause down for hearing on bill and answer.2 2 On such a hear-
ing, however, the decree is final,2 3 and not interlocutory, as in the
case of an order on the hearing of a demurrer. In other respects,
a hearing on bill and answer, so far as sufficiency of the answer is
concerned, involves practically the same incidents as a hearing on
a demurrer and is in effect an indirect method of demurring to an
answer.
In Virginia and West Virginia, it is said, the regular equity
practice has been supplemented by an unorthodox practice in-
dulged in by the courts, by virtue of which the sufficiency of an
answer in any respect might, prior to the present statutes, have
been determined by exception or objection to the answer.
"Strictly speaking the office of an exception to an answer
in equity is to specifically point out some particular allegation
of the bill which is not responded to, or to which a better or
more specific answer is required, or to rid the answer, when
desired, of some scandalous or impertinent matter.
"But in this state and in Virginia, by a loose practice
indulged, the sufficiency of an answer as a whole or in part
may be challenged by an objection or exception thereto; and
perhaps, on specific objection to immaterial matter in the
answer, such matter may be eliminated, and the issues thereby
limited to the material facts put in issue by the bill and
answer.
"The practice in some of our federal courts to treat a de-
murrer to an answer, or general exceptions thereto which are
equivalent to a demurrer, as a motion to set the cause down
for hearing on bill and answer, and a waiver of the right to
contest the facts alleged, has not been followed in the courts
of this state. And where such general exceptions are inter-
posed to an answer and one or more of the allegations thereof
may be good or sufficient to put in issue some material fact
alleged in the bill, the decree below overruling such exception
as a whole will not be reversed on appeal. " 24
It will be noted that this anomalous practice, particularly as
2 2 FLETC ER, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 332; CLEPHANE, EQUIT
PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 305; LANGDELL, EQUrITr PLEADING, § 83.
23 LANGDELL, EQUIT PLEADING, § 83.
24 Lawrence v. Montgomery Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 382, 99 S. E. 496 (1919).
It may be that this practice came into vogue in order to escape the finality that
resulted from a hearing on bill and answer.
7
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exemplified in the last sentence of the quotation, recognizes an ob-
jection or exception to an answer as practically the equivalent of
a demurrer.
It is a fundamental rule, both in equity and at law, that a
pleading is not demurrable because it contains a surplusage. Uile
per inutile non vitiatur. Hence a bill or an answer in equity is not
demurrable merely because it contains scandalous or impertinent
matter. The proper procedure is to except to the bill or the
answer.2 "- At the common law, the proper procedure is a motion
to strike.2
6
The common law and equity methods outlined above were sup-
plemented by the former Code with a statutory method for testing
the sufficiency of a plea.
"When a plea is offered in any action or suit, which is
not sufficient in law to constitute a defense therein, the plain-
tiff may object to the filing thereof on that ground, and the
same shall be rejected. But. if the court overrule the objection
and allow the plea to be filed, the plaintiff may take issue
thereon without losing the benefit of the objection, and may,
on an appeal from a judgment rendered in the case in favor
of the defendant, avail himself of the error committed in allow-
ing such plea to be filed, without excepting to the decision of
the court thereon. " 27
It will be noted that this section, by using the words "action
or suit", purports to apply to both law and equity, and it may be
that the practice described above permitting a general exception or
objection to an answer was adopted by analogy from this section
relating to pleas.2 8 However, the primary object of the statute is
understood to have been to provide a method of escape from conse-
quences incidental to demurring to a common law plea. Under
the common law and the former Code, if the plaintiff demurred to
a plea and the demurrer was overruled, he was compelled to with-
draw his demurrer before he could reply to the plea.2" When the
demurrer was withdrawn, of course no question could be raised on
25 FLECHIR, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, §§ 185, 337; 1 WmTEHOUSE,
EQuiry PRACTICE, §§ 108, 274.
26 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 177 S. E. 188 (W. Va. 1934); 49 0. J.
368 and cases cited.
27 CODE 1923, c. 125, § 56.
28 The objection, in conformity with the method prescribed by the statute,
was usually interposed by way of objeection to the filing of the answer. See
Ward v. Ward's Heirs, 50 W. Va. 517, 40 S. E. 472 (1901) ; Gauley Coal Land
Association v. Spies, 61 W. Va. 19, 55 S. E. 903 (1906).
- Camden Clay Co. v. New Martinsville, 67 W. Va. 525, 68 S. E. 118 (1910).
See BuRxs, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 343.
8
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error as to the soundness of the trial court's ruling on the de-
murrer. The statute obviously was framed so as to avoid such a
consequence on objection to the filing of a plea. As will be more
fully noted hereinafter, this statutory practice relating to pleas
has been extended by the Virginia and West Virginia courts to
replications. and subsequent pleadings.
Another provision of the former Code provided a statutory
method, in lieu of a special demurrer, for objecting to certain
formal defects.
"No demurrer shall be sustained because of the omission
in any pleading of the words, 'this he is ready to verify', or
'this he is ready to verify by the record', or 'as appears by the
record'; but the opposite party may be excused from replying,
demurring or otherwise answering to any pleading which
ought to have, but has not such words therein, until they be
inserted.'"30
It is undoubtedly the policy of the Revised Code, partly by
expressed language and partly by proscription of other methods,
to establish the demurrer as the one and only uniform method of
testing the sufficiency of a pleading. That, perhaps due to in-
advertence, the avowed objective has not quite been reached, will
be noted hereinafter. It is first desired to call attention to the pre-
cise results which apparently were intended to be accomplished.
It must be noted that the statutes emphatically do not under-
take to prescribe a demurrer as the method for raising all ob-
jections to pleadings.
"The sufficiency of any pleading, in law or equity, may
be tested by a demurrer. Objections to the filing of any
pleading, because of insufficiency, are abolished."'
"Exceptions to answers for insufficiency are abolished.
The test of sufficiency shall be made by a demurrer; if found
insufficient, but amendable, the court may allow an amend-
ment on terms."
32
Only the first provision quoted relates to common law plead-
ings. In terms, the first sentence of this provision is only per-
missive, and not mandatory, in effect. However, the second
sentence abolishes the provision in the former Code "3 establishing
the only alternative to a demurrer as a means of testing the suf-
ficiency of the substance of a common law pleading, together with
30 CODE 1923, c. 125, § 29.
31 REv. CODE, c. 56, aft. 4, § 36.
32 REV. CODE, C. 56, art. 4, § 65.
3 3 Supra n. 27.
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any analogous practice adopted by the courts beyond the confines
of the statute, and th4 result is the same as if the first sentence
had been mandatory in terms.
The first provision expressly abolishes any objection to the
filing of any pleading in equity because of insufficiency, whether
under the former statute or under any peculiar court practice;
while the second provision specifically abolishes exceptions to
answers in equity for insufficiency. If there should be any doubt
as to whether the term "exceptions" is intended to include a
possible objection to an answer after it is filed, a vestige of the
"loose practice" noted above, the consequences would seem to be
immaterial; because in the second provision, contrary to the mode
of statement in the first, the use of a demurrer to test the suf-
ficiency of an answer is made mandatory.
It may be stated definitely that objection to the filing of any
pleading because of insufficiency and exception to any pleading for
insufficiency, whether at law or in equity, are abolished and pro-
hibited. It will be noted, however, that there is no expressed
inhibition against testing the sufficiency of a plea in equity by
setting it down for argument, as under the equity practice. In
fact, the Revised Code contains a provision,"' carried over from
the former Code, for setting a plea in equity down for argument.
"A plaintiff in equity may have any plea or demurrer set
down to be argued."
The only object in having a plea set down for argument would be
to determine the sufficiency of the plea. Hence the provision could
serve no other purpose than to prescribe a method for testing the
sufficiency of the plea, and it would seem, therefore, that the Re-
vised Code provides alternative methods for testing the sufficiency
of a plea in equity. However, since the provision last quoted is
contrary to the general policy of the revision and its retention
was likely due to inadvertence, and since the same results would
follow from a demurrer to the plea, it would seem preferable to
resort to a demurrer. Whether, by resorting to the alternative
equity practice, a plaintiff could escape the necessity of assigning
grounds for insufficiency of the plea, would be a debatable question.
Such a requirement might be imposed as coming within the spirit
of the statute requiring statement of grounds in a demurrer.
34 Rv. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 56.
10
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Seemingly, there would be no place where the grounds could be
stated except in the order setting the plea down for argument.
There is likewise no express inhibition against setting a cause
down for hearing on bill and answer, although the section in the
former Code expressly providing for such a practice has been sub-
stantially modified, possibly with a view to eliminating the
practice. The former Code section, substantially declaratory of
the equity practice, is as follows:
"A plaintiff in equity may, at or after the rule day at
which the bill is taken for confessed as to any defendant, or
at which his answer is filed, have the cause set for hearing as
to such defendant; and it may be so set for hearing on the
answer, or upon a general replication thereto, as the plaintiff
may prefer. If two months elapse after the answer of a de-
fendant is filed, without the case being so set and without
exceptions being filed to his answer, he may have the case set
for hearing as to himself. ",s
The section appears in the Revised Code as follows:
"Whenever a suit in equity is matured at rules as to all
of the defendants, it shall be the ex officio duty of the clerk, as
soon as the same is matured, to set the case for hearing as to
them. If the suit is matured as to only a part of the de-
fendants, the plaintiff may appear at rules and have it set
for hearing as to such part. If one month elapse after the
answer of a defendant is filed, -without the case being so set
and without a demurrer being filed to his answer, such de-
fendant may appear at rules and have the case set for hearing
as to himself. "36
It will be noted that the provision in the former section
specifically permitting the plaintiff to have the cause set for hear-
ing on the answer, or, at his option, on the replication to the
answer, has been omitted from the new section. Owing to the fact
that the revisers' note makes no comment on the omission, it is left
to surmise as to whether it was the intention to dispense with a
hearing on bill and answer at the instance of the plaintiff, on the
assumption that he should be compelled to resort to a demurrer as
a means of testing the sufficiency of the answer, or whether it was
the understanding that the general provisions in the new section
would include the specific methods of hearing provided for in the
former section. It seems most likely, in view of the other statutory
35 CODE 1923, c. 125, § 50.
30 GEv. CODE, C. 56, art. 4, § 68.
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provisions and the general policy of the revision, that the in-
tention was that the new section should include all the methods of
hearing embodied in the former section, with the exception that
the plaintiff should not be given the privilege of having the cause
set for hearing on bill and answer. When a bill is taken for con-
fessed in default of a demurrer or an answer at rules, the cause is
matured for a hearing on default. Also, when a demurrer, or an
answer and replication or a plea and replication have been filed
at rules, the suit is matured at rules on an issue of law or of fact.
But if an answer setting up new matter purely in confession and
avoidance has been filed, the typical case where a plaintiff would
have the cause set for hearing on bill and answer, the suit would
not be matured and the clerk could not set it for hearing until a
replication had been filed. In such a situation under the former
section, if the plaintiff desired to test the sufficiency of the answer,
he clearly had a right (although, as heretofore noted, he usually
resorted to an exception or objection) to have the cause set for
hearing on bill and answer. The new section gives him no such
privilege, nor does it lodge any such power in the clerk until the
suit has been "matured"; in other words, until a replication has
been filed. However, the filing of a replication would call upon
the defendant for proof and would concede the sufficiency of the
answer. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the provision"T
dealing specifically with answers provides, mandatorily, that "the
test of sufficiency shall be made by demurrer." There being no
doubt that the plaintiff would have the right to demur, it might
be surmised that it would be wholly immaterial whether he should
also be given the privilege to have the cause set for hearing on bill
and answer. As to merely testing the sufficiency of the answer,
the surmise would be correct; but there would be a substantial
difference in the consequences. As already noted, a hearing on
bill and answer is final; while a hearing on demurrer is not neces-
sarily so. If the demurrer were sustained, the defendant might be
permitted to amend ;38 while if the demurrer should be overruled,
the plaintiff would always be permitted to reply.
There still remains a possibility that the sufficiency of an
answer might be tested by having the cause set for hearing on bill
and answer. The new section last quoted, substantially in accord
with the old section, gives the defendant the right to have the
37 Supra n. 32.
38 Iden.
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cause set for hearing when his answer has been filed for a month
and the cause has not been set for hearing by the plaintiff or the
clerk and no demurrer has been filed to the answer. Nothing is
said as to the nature of the hearing. Presumably, it would be a
final hearing on the merits, possibly involving sufficiency of the
answer. Otherwise, it would result merely in a dismissal of the
bill for failure to prosecute. If the latter result had been the one
intended, apparently the statute would have said so. In fact, the
simple and obvious remedy would have been to dispense with any
hearing at all and simply provide that the bill should be dismissed
at rules by the clerk for failure to prosecute, as would result under
the statutes9 in other instances where the plaintiff fails to prose-
cute his suit.
The abolishment of former methods of objecting and the shift
to the demurrer might have entailed inadequacies and embarrass-
ments in the new procedure if consideration had not been given to
the consequences involved. Under the orthodox equity practice,
exceptions to an answer are required to be specific. Wherefore,
under the former Code, which required no assignment of grounds
in a demurrer, a demurrer would not have been an adequate sub-
stitute for exceptions to an answer. However, under the Revised
Code, as has already been noted,40 a demurrer is required to "state
specifically the grounds of demurrer", and it would seem to be
within the power of the court to require the same degree of
specification in a demurrer as in exceptions to an answer. . Under
the former Code,41 it was not desirable to demur to a plea, be-
cause, if the demurrer should be overruled, it was necessary to
withdraw the demurrer before a replication could be filed. Under
the Revised Code, such an embarrassment is obviated by a pro-
vision 42 permitting a plaintiff to demur and reply at the same
time. However, as to stages of the pleadings after the replication
stage, the situation is different.
The former statute 3 permitting objection to the filing of a
pleading because of insufficiency relates only to pleas; but, whether
from analogy to the statute or from a practice developed inde-
pendently by the courts, as in Virginia,44 the practice of permitting
30 REV. CODE, C. 56, art. 4, §§ 6, 7.
4oSupra n. 12.
41 Supra n. 29.
42 REV. CoDE, e. 56, art. 4, § 39.
43Supra n. 27.
44 See BuRKs, Zoo. cit. supea n. 29.
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objection to the filing of replications and subsequent pleadings for
such reason has been recognized in West Virginia.4 5 Such a practice
is now prohibited by the new statutes. Yet there is no provision
permitting a party to demur and plead at the same time to any
pleading beyond the replication stage. For example, a defendant
is not permitted to demur and rejoin at the same time. Conse-
quently, after the replication stage, a party will be faced with the
necessity of withdrawing his demurrer before he can plead, a
dilemma which he escaped under the former practice when he was
permitted to object to the filing of the pleading. This would seem
to be a consideration, in addition to others elsewhere indicated by
the writer, 6 why a party should now be permitted to demur and
plead at the same time at any stage of the pleadings.
We now come to a consideration of the question, To what
extent have the provisions in the Revised Code prescribed a de-
murrer as the only method of objecting to a pleading? As may be
surmised from what has already been said, an answer to this
question will depend upon the construction which should be placed
upon the words "sufficiency" and "insufficiency" as used in the
statutes.4 7 Do the statutes mean sufficiency of a pleading solely
with reference to its allegations and form -its substantial and
formal content -or do they mean sufficiency in a broader sense,
with reference to extrinsic conditions and circumstances which do
not go to the intrinsic merits of the pleading as a pleading, but
merely place external limitations upon its availability, such as lack
of an affidavit or failure to tender the pleading within a proper
time ?
There is nothing in the statutes nor in the revisers' notes to
indicate that the Revisers, in adopting the demurrer as the uni-
form method for testing the sufficiency of a pleading, intended to
strain or warp the ordinary functions of a demurrer. The de-
murrer is merely adopted, without qualification, as a substitute
for other methods of testing the sufficiency. The field of its appli-
cation is broadened, but there is nothing to indicate any intention
to alter its inherent and basic operative functions. In fact, the
contrary is indicated by the fact that the Revisers justify the sub-
45 Quaker City Nat. Bank v. Showacre, 26 W. Va. 48 (1885); Spenco v.
Robinson, 35 W. Va. 313, 13 S. .
1004 (1891) 
48 Carlin, Comomon Law Pleas and Subsequent Pleadings in West Virginic
(1931) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 14, 35.
47 $upra notes 31 and 32.
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stitution by undertaking to demonstrate that the superseded meth-
ods substantially performed the orthodox functions of a demurrer
under other names; in other words, that the revision merely under-
takes to change the form of the procedure and not the substance.48
Furthermore, the language in which the superseded methods are
abolished indicates an intention to place only a limited ban upon
them. "Objections to the filing of any pleading, because of in-
sufficiency, are abolished." 4 9  "Exceptions to answers for insuf-
ficiency are abolished." 9  If it was the intention to abolish all
objections to filing and all exceptions, why were the italicised
words not omitted! Such would have been the line of least
resistance in expression. The insertion of these words must have
called for a special effort, and the effort can be explained and
justified only by the supposition of a purpose. As to the motive,
the only logical conclusion is that the words were intended to de-
limit a class of objections to which a demurrer is to apply, ex-
cluding another class which is to remain unaffected by the statutes;
and it is submitted that there is no logical means of determining
the line of demarcation except by resorting to a consideration of
the comman law and equity functions of a demurrer as a device
for testing the sufficiency of a pleading. As already indicated, the
function of a demurrer, independently of statutory regulation, is
to test the intrinsic merits of a pleading, and not to interpose
extrinsic objections to its reception or operation.
Wherefore, it is submitted that objection may still be inter-
posed to the filing of a pleading on the ground that it is tendered
too late. In fact, such a practice is expressly recognized in the
Revised Code. 1 A similar practice is also recognized where a plea
lacks an affidavit.9 2 Consequently, it should be inferred that, in
instances where the statutes are silent as to the method of objecting
because of lack of an affidavit, the West Virginia courts will follow
the Virginia decision and other cases in accord 3 holding that a
demurrer is not proper. Logically, the affidavit does not go to
the sufficiency of the pleading as a pleading. It adds nothing to
the allegations. It operates merely as a method of preliminary
proof of the truth of the allegations, and hence performs an evi-
48 See revisers' note to REv. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 36.
-49 See n. 31, supra. Italics supplied.
1o Seri n. 32, mupra. Italics supplied.
al C. 56, art. 4, § 33.
62 REV. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 32.
s3 Supra n. 16.
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dentiary rather than a pleading function. Even this evidentiary
function ceases when it has once performed its purpose of fulfilling
the condition upon which the pleading may be filed. In short, the
affidavit serves as a sort of statutory one-man secta. It has been
held that a demurrer, because it admits the truth of the allegations,
dispenses with the necessity for an affidavit where it would other-
wise be necessary.54
As to the objection that an amended declaration departs from
the original, if the court shall continue to adhere to the view that
such a circumstance is foreign and extrinsic to the merits and suf-
ficiency of the amended declaration, as it has heretofore held," it
would seem that there is nothing in the Revised Code that would
make a demurrer proper in such a case. In fact, a refusal on ob-
jection to file an amended pleading on such a ground is merely
an exemplification of the ordinary practice relating to amend-
ments. A court has a general discretion as to whether an amend-
ment will be permitted. Precisely for the reason that such dis-
cretion may be concerned with considerations extrinsic to the
merits of the amended pleading, the discretion is not properly
called into operation by a demurrer after the amendment has been
filed, but by objection to permission to amend, which means, pro-
cedurally, objection to reception and filing of the amended plead-
ing, or motion to strike it after it has been filedY' Certainly it
could not have been the intention to apply the procedural mechan-
ism of a demurrer to the whole field of discretion relating to
amendments. On the contrary, the Revised Code seems to show
specific recognition of a motion to strike as the proper method for
getting rid of an improper amendment.5
A demurrer is not the proper method even for testing the
sufficiency of a pleading for all purposes and on every occasion.
Its use must await the arrival of the time when a proper test may
be made by demurrer. The sufficiency of a pleading may become
54 Keach v. Hamilton, 84 Ill. App. 413 (1889) ; City of Chicago v. Banker,
112 Ill. App. 94 (1901); Fowler v. Fowler, 204 Ill. 82, 68 N. E. 414 (1903).
55 McMechen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., supra n. 19.
"5Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 30 So. 517 (1903);
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 165 Ky. 235, 176 S. W. 1013,(1915).
Ordinary departures may be reached by a demurrer. For instance, a repli-
cation is demurrable if it departs from the declaration; a rejoinder, if it
departs from the plea. A reason for differentiating such departures from
departures involving amendments, as to the method of objecting, may be that,
in the one case the pleading is filed as a matter of right, while in the other
case the pleading involves a general discretion as to its reception.
57 REV. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 25.
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involved in various ways in the procedure relating to the granting
or refusal of interlocutory relief, as in a case involving a pre-
liminary injunction. A defendant may oppose the granting of an
injunction or move to dissolve it on the ground that the bill is
insufficient. He should not be compelled to resort to a demurrer
for such purposes, but should be permitted to urge insufficiency
of the bill in support of his objection or motion. A defendant
should not be compelled to subject himself to the incidents of a
remedy opposing final relief until final relief is sought. Although
it is common practice in West Virginia for a defendant to oppose
the granting of an injunction or seek to dissolve it in vacation
through the medium of a demurrer,is it may very well be doubted
whether there is any authority in this state to file a demurrer in
vacation.5 9 If it can be filed in vacation at all, it may, conceivably,
in due course of time, be entertained for one or both of two dif-
ferent purposes: (1) as a substitute for objection to granting or
motion to dissolve the injunction (since equity looks to the sub-
stance of procedure rather than to the form) ; and (2) as an ap-
pearance in bar to the final merits of the case. The mere fact that
the suit has not been matured in pursuance of the ordinary course
of procedure presents no obstacle to entertaining and deciding the
demurrer. Process and rule proceedings may be waived by the
defendant,6 0 and, if the demurrer can be received in vacation, no
reason is perceived why the case can not then and there be placed
on the docket for a hearing on demurrer. But whether a hearing
on the demurrer can then take place in vacation, in lieu of a mere
adjudication as to the interlocutory relief, or must await the arrival
of a court session, is a different question.61 A hearing on a de-
58 See Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921).
5oCity of Wheeling v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 81 W. Va. 438,
94 S. E. 511 (1917).
60 Lamp v. Locke, supra n. 58.
61 See City of Wheeling v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., supra 3L 59.
"The ruling upon the application for the injunction only incidentally in-
volved sufficiency of the bill." faem.
The Georgia cases seem to be me most nearly in point.
"4A demurrer to a bill could not be made and disposed of in vacation and
before the term of court to which the bill was returned had arrived; and
although it could then be used as a cause shown against the grant of an
injunction or ne exeat, or the appointment of a receiver, it stood over for
a hearing at the term to which the bill was returned. Under the law, it
could only be heard then, or thereafter upon notice or order that it be heard
in vacation." The Old Hickory Distilling Co. v. Blyer, 74 Ga. 201 (1884).
"At the interlocutory hearing of a petition for injunction demurrer to
the petition can be considered only as showing why an interlocutory in-
junction should not be granted, and the judge can not, at chambers, before
the appearance term, either overrule or sustain such demurrer." Reynolds
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murrer is a hearing on the merits as to final relief and it does not
seem to be the policy of the local law to permit such a hearing in
vacation, except, of course, by consent of the parties.02 If the
demurrer can not be heard in vacation as a demurrer, then neces-
sarily, in spite of the new regulations, the right to the interlocutory
relief must be tested by objection or motion, whether or not under
the name of a demurrer.
Similar questions may arise with reference to procedure in-
volving other phases of interlocutory relief, such as an application
for appointment of a receiver, and apparently should be settled by
the same principles.
The Revisers have expressly indicated 3 that it was not their
intention to abolish a motion to strike scandalous or impertinent
matter- in other words, surplusage - from equity pleadings.
The Supreme Court has recently decided 4 that a like motion is
proper with reference to surplusage in a common law pleading.
Attention has already been called to a provision in the former
Code 5 substituting a statutory method of objecting, in lieu of a
special demurrer, with reference to certain formal defects. This
provision has been carried into the Revised Code 0 and supplies
another instance where objection to a pleading may be interposed
without a demurrer.
Other instances than those enumerated undoubtedly will be
found where objection to a pleading may still be raised without
resort to a demurrer. No attempt has been made to exhaust the
& Hamby Estate Mortgage Co. v. Kingbery, 118 Ga. 254, 45 S. E. 235 (1903).
"A judgment overruling a demurrer to a petition for injunction and
receiver, rendered upon an interlocutory hearing in vacation before the ap-
pearance term, is a mere nullity. '1 To omer v. Warren, 123 Ga. 477, 51 S. E.
393 (1905).
62 In the absence of a statute so providing, no decree of any kind can
be entered in the vacation of the court." HoGG's EQurrY PR0oEDUr (2d
ed. 1921) § 600, quoted with approval in McGibson v. County Court, 95 W.
Va. 338, 121- S. E. 99 (1924), holding that there would be no power to
dissolve an injunction in vacation in the absence of statutory authority.
It will be noted that, while the statutes give the court power to grant or
dissolve an injunction in vacation, no power is given to decide a demurrer
in vacation. If express statutory authority to dissolve is necessary, where
only interlocutory relief is involved, such authority would be all the more
necessary to decide a demurrer, involving final relief.
"'A judge in vacation may dissolve an injunction, but cannot dismiss the
bill." Logan v. Ballard, 61 W. Va. 526, 57 S. E. 143 (1907). Neither can
final relief be granted in vacation by way of perpetuating the injunction.
Conley v. Brewer, 85 W. Va. 725, 102 S. E. 607 (1920).
03 See revisers' note to REV. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 36.
64 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, supa n. 26.
65 Supra n. 30.
GO C. 56, art. 4, § 37.
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field of possibilities. It is only hoped that enough has leen said
to dispel the illusion that a demurrer is the only resort.
In conclusion, attention is called to what may be ecnsidered
an overstatement by the Revisers, when they say that "a motion to
strike out a plea has the same effect upon the legal sufficiency
thereof that a demurrer thereto would have had. '"6 7 If the decla-
ration should be good, this statement would be true; but if the
declaration should be substantially bad, a demurrer would have a
more radical effect than a motion to strike. It is a familiar
principle in the' law of demurrers that a demurrer opens up the
record back through the entire series of pleadings, and that the
demurrer is applied to the first s-qbstantially faulty pleading in the
series. This principle, in later days, seems to have been largely
unfamiliar to practitioners in West Virginia, 8 possibly due in part
to the fact that, under the former practice hereinbefore noted, the
custom has been to object to the filing of pleadings subsequent to
the declaration rather than to demur. On objection to the filing
of a pleading, according to the weight of. authority, only the suf-
ficiency of the pleading objected to is considered and the record is
not opened. 69 The status of this retroactive function of a demurrer
is doubtful under the Revised Code, due to the fact that application
of the principle clashes with the requirement that a demurrer must
state grounds. Obviously, a demurrer to a plea would not state
grounds of demurrer to a declaration. The result may be that the
demurrer can be given no retroactive effect except as to grounds
which the court notices of its own accord.
67 See revisers' note to REV. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 36.
68 No instance has been noted where the principle has been applied in a
common law action subsequent to 1870. See Hoake v. Hoke, 3 W. Va. 561
(1869); Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138 (1870); Jarrett v. Nickell, 4
W. Va. 276 (1870); Doolittie v. County Court, 28 W. Va. 158 (1886). The
latter case was a proceeding in mandamus.
69 Chesapeake & Ohio R. B. Co. v. Bison, 99 Va. 18, 28-29, 37 S. E. 320
(1900); 49 C. J. 687, citing some cases contra. Strictly and Formally, a
pleading could not open the record until it had been fied and so had become
a part of the record. On the other hand, the objection to ling may be
considered as a substitute for a demurrer and hence, by liberal application,
,as involving all the incidents of a demurrer.
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